We report robust evidence of a new short-run monetary election cycle: the monthly growth rate of the money supply (M1) around elections is higher than in other months in a sample of low and middle income countries. We hypothesize this is related to systemic vote buying. Consistent with this, we find no cycle in authoritarian countries and countries with strong political institutions and a pronounced cycle in elections where international election monitors reported vote buying or in close elections. Using survey data on daily consumer expenditure, we show that within household consumption of food increases in the days before elections. 
Introduction
The theory of political business cycles in monetary aggregates, pioneered by Nordhaus (1975) and MacRae (1977) and given its modern, rational choice interpretation by Persson and Tabellini (1990) , predicts monetary expansions in the quarters leading up to an election and an election-time economic boom. The ultimate goal is to help the incumbent government win votes. Empirical tests of this theory have, however, fared badly and the evidence on monetary political cycles of the classical Nordhaus-MacRae type is weak, as pointed out in the surveys by Paldam (1997) and Drazen (2001) . We provide new evidence on the monetary effects of elections and strive to offer an alternative perspective on the money-election nexus. In contrast to past work on monetary political cycles which emphasizes deliberate manipulations of monetary policy instruments by the central bank in the quarters prior to elections, we argue that the effect is concurrent with elections and works through money demand rather than through supply side interventions by the central bank.
We investigate if the growth rate of the monetary aggregate M1 -defined as the total amount of cash in circulation plus transferable deposits held by all money holding sectors -increases in election months in a panel of up to 104 low and middle income countries for the years 1975-2015. We estimate a dynamic short-run money demand function.
Our baseline specification is a dynamic panel model with year, month and country fixed effects. In a more demanding specification, we include interactions between these fixed effects and thus identify the effect of elections on the growth rate of M1 by testing if, within an election year, the growth rate of M1 is higher during the month of an election, after removing common shocks that happen within a month in a given year and countryspecific seasonality. We find evidence of an increase in the growth rate of M1 in election and post-election months in these countries. The effect is sizable: the growth rate of M1, on average, increases by between 0.41 and 0.61 percentage points or by about 1/13th of a standard deviation in election months. We are unable to find similar effects among reported by the monitors to be free and fair. Second, large-scale vote buying does not usually occur in countries with consolidated "authoritarian" political institutions where the elections are heavily controlled by the incumbent government eliminating the need to buy votes or conversely in countries with strong democratic institutions where checks and balances make large-scale vote buying impossible. Consistent with this line of reasoning, we find that the election date effect exhibits an inverse U-shaped relation with indicators on the quality of a country's political institutions: the election date effect is statistically significant only for countries in between the two extremes. Third, we also find evidence that the election date effect is largest in close elections during which competition among candidates is intense and vote buying of greatest value. Fourth, vote buying can affect M1 by funding extra consumption. This happens, for example, if the cash used to buy votes was hoarded in the black economy and returns to the banking system when voters spend it. To provide evidence on this mechanism, we undertake a micro-econometric study of anomalies in household consumption around elections in Armenia. Armenia exhibits a marked increase of currency in circulation in the days around the elections it has held since 2003 and reports from international election monitors and in the local press are full of anecdotal evidence of vote buying on a massive scale. Using daily household level consumption diaries from a large consumption survey, we adopt the approach first developed by Mitra et al. (2017) in a study of vote buying in India. We find that consumption expenditures on many food items spike in the days around elections. A plausible funding source for this extra consumption is income earned by selling votes.
Our paper contributes directly to two strands of literature. First, we contribute to the research on monetary political business cycles with a new stylized fact: the growth rate of M1 is systematically higher around elections and this cannot be explained by country-specific macro-economic shocks in election years, by common shocks that affect all countries in a given month, or by country-specific seasonality. In doing so, we shift the attention away from central bank engineered cycles of the type proposed by Nordhaus (1975) and MacRae (1977) to cycles created at the demand side of the money market 4 00820 9
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around elections. Second, we contribute to the literature on vote buying by suggesting that systemic, large-scale vote buying has aggregate monetary effects. Specifically, we add to an emerging literature that relates illegal but unobserved electoral activities to observable anomalies timed around elections. Kapur and Vaishnav (2013) shows that Indian construction firms divert short-term funds to political campaigns (in anticipation of post-electoral preferential treatment) and that this induces a short-term election cycle in cement consumption in the election and post-election month. The macroeconomic effect on M1 that we find is also concentrated in the election and post-election month.
Sukhtankar ( The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our data, identification strategy, and the main results. Section 3 discuses evidence on the monetary mechanisms behind the election date effect. Section 4 introduces the vote buying hypothesis and presents evidence consistent with it. Section 5 concludes. The supplementary material contains extra estimation results, case-study evidence and a simple model of the money market that illustrates the possible links between vote buying and M1.
A new monetary election cycle
Existing models of political business cycles in monetary aggregates emphasize that politicians who seek reelection will employ monetary instruments to generate a favorable eco-1 Zitzewitz (2012) reviews the literature that uses the tool-kit of applied economics to detect illegal behavior, including corruption. For reviews of the literature on corruption, see Aidt (2003) , Pande (2008) or Olken and Pande (2012) . 
Data
To establish the new stylized fact, we study two panels of countries for which we can observe M1 at the monthly frequency for the years between 1975 and 2015. The primary sample consists of up to 104 non-OECD countries while the secondary sample consists of 17 OECD countries.
4
The unit of analysis is a country, year and month triple. To be included in the sample, a country must hold elections and its central bank must report monthly data on M1 to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As a consequence, the panels are unbalanced. Data on M1 are published by International Monetary Fund (2018) and are recorded at the end of each month. We obtain data on election months from the 2
The original Nordhaus (1975) and MacRae (1977) models focus on a Phillips curve trade-off between inflation and unemployment and predict an expansion of monetary aggregates or a reduction in central bank rates prior to the election. Alesina et al.
(1997, Chapter 1) offers an overview of these models. See, for example, Alesina et al. (1992 Alesina et al. ( , 1993 Beck et al. (2001) and data on election dates from the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (2015) . Table A1 in the supplementary material lists the countries in the two samples.
As the baseline, we estimate a short-run money demand function of the following kind:
The dependent variable -∆lnM 1 -is the growth rate of M1, where M1 is defined as the total amount of cash in circulation plus transferable deposits held by all money holding sectors, in country c and month m in year y.
5
Short-run money demand is a function of past growth in M1 (between one and six lags), the annual growth rate of the price level (P ), the annual growth rate of real GDP per capita (Y ) and, in some specifications, the monthly change in the nominal interest rate (R).
6
The vector X includes control variables in levels measured for countries and years: GDP per capita, a proxy for wealth (resource rents as a share of GDP), the exchange rate against the US dollar, 7 the quality
5
One reason we take the growth rates of M1 as our dependent variable rather than its levels is that M1 is measured in national currency. The data quality also varies from country to country. Consequently we trim the data on ∆lnM 1 at its bottom and top one percentiles. Our estimates remain robust to alternative strategies, see Table A5 , columns (5) and (6) in the supplementary material.
6
We proxy the short-run nominal interest rate by the monthly interest rate on treasury bonds. These data come from International Monetary Fund (2018) and are only available for around half of the countries in our sample. Consequently, we do not include the interest rate variable in most specifications.
of institutions proxied by the Polity IV index normalized between zero and one (Center for Systematic Peace 2015), and for whether a country in a given year is a new democracy in the sense of Brender and Drazen (2005) .
8 Table A2 in the supplementary material reports summary statistics and data sources. All specifications include country (µ), year (η) and month (ν) fixed effects. In more demanding specifications, we seasonally adjust the data on M1, as well as replacing country, year and month fixed effects with country×year, year×month and country×month fixed effects. is the error term.
9
The main variable of interest is E. It captures the timing of elections and is coded in two alternative ways. The main coding records the month in which an election takes place. This can be coded for all elections in our samples. Specifically, the dummy variable Election month is defined as being equal to one if at least one election takes place in country c in month m and year y and zero otherwise. The second coding -Election day -in the spirit of Franzese (2000), takes into account the precise timing of an election within a month. It is equal to the election date divided by 31 for the election month and zero otherwise. four elections following a transition from autocracy (negative score on the Polity IV index) to democracy (non-negative score on the Polity IV index) after which it becomes an old democracy.
We cluster the errors at the level of countries. A small fraction of our monthly observations corresponds to elections and, for this reason, it may be better to bootstrap the errors than to cluster. We find that the bootstrapped and cluster standard errors are very similar. (1) and (2) show specifications with the seven main time-varying controls. Columns (3) and (4) add controls for the level, lag and change in the treasury bill rate for the smaller subsample of countries for which this information is available. All these specifications of equation (1) include year, month and country fixed effects and three lags of the monthly growth rate of M1.
12
The specifications utilize the maximum number of country-year pair observations available (the total sample) in each case, and the number of observations, therefore, varies from column to column. In all cases, we find a significant (at the five percent level or better) increase in the growth rate of M1 in election months. In the the end of the month. An election that takes place at the end of the month gets weight 1, while an election that takes place at the beginning gets weight 1/31.
11
We estimate equation (1) with a fixed effects estimator. In the dynamic specifications, this causes Nickell's bias. However, since our data are monthly, we have over 500 time periods, so the size of the bias is likely to be very small. We have nonetheless estimated equation (1) with a difference-GMM estimator which instruments the lagged dependent variables with their lags. The results, which are reported Table   A5 , columns (10) and (11) in the supplementary material, are very similar to those obtained with the fixed effects estimator. (3) and (4)).
12

13
The baseline specification in equation (1) includes country, year and month fixed effects and estimates the election date effect using within country variation across years and months. We can restrict the variation further to engage with three potentially confounding factors. First, we can control for country×year fixed effects. This enables us to identify the election date effect from high-frequency changes in the growth rate of M1 happening before an election while controlling for all other country-specific macroeconomic changes that may occur during election years.
14 Second, we can control for month×year fixed effects. Unlike the month fixed effects in the baseline specification, this controls for common macro shocks, such as a financial crisis, international financial flows etc., that affect all countries in a given month within a year. Finally, the monthly data exhibit a high degree of seasonality. We can control for this by seasonally adjusting the monthly M1 series for each country with the X12-ARIMA procedure used by the US Census Bureau and via country×month fixed effects.
15
13
The range of the observed monthly growth rate in M1 is from -11 to 19%. Table A5 , columns (5) and (6) in the supplementary material exclude the 1% and 5% most extreme values of M1, respectively, and show that the estimate of the election date effect is not sensitive to outliers.
14
In the baseline, such country-specific macro-economic effects are picked up by the control variables.
15
The combination of these three interactions subsumes the country, year and month fixed effects and the control variables included in the baseline. Resource rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents as share of GDP. Columns (1)- (4) use the total available sample. Columns (5)- (9) and (10)- (14) fix the sample where the samples of all of these five specifications overlap.
9
Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Table 1 , columns (6) to (9) report specifications that include these three combinations of fixed effects. The dependent variable in columns (8) and (9) is the growth rate of seasonally adjusted M1. Columns (10) to (14) show the corresponding results for the smaller sample where we can control for the interest rate. As discussed above, the data on election months, election days and the control variables are available for different samples and the seasonal adjustment implies a small loss of observations. To ensure comparability across these regressions, we fix the sample such that the country-year pairs are the same across columns (5) to (9) and (10) to (14), respectively. Columns (5) and (10) replicate the baseline regressions without interacted fixed effects on the two "fixed samples" and confirm the baseline results.
These specifications identify the election date effect by testing if, within an election year, the growth rate of M1 is higher during the month of an election, after removing common shocks and country-specific seasonality. The coefficient on election month is 0.0041 without seasonally adjusting the data (column (6)) and 0.0037 with seasonal adjustment (column (8)). In both cases, the estimates are smaller than the corresponding estimate in column (5) but significant at the 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
Columns (7) and (9) show the corresponding results for election day and columns (10) to (14) show the results for the smaller sample for which interest rate data is available. In all cases, the election date effect is statistically significant. These results show that the baseline estimates are remarkably robust and that the election date effect that we find is not an artifact of common shocks (month×year fixed effect), country-specific seasonality (country×month fixed effects) or country-specific macro-economic events within election years (country×year fixed effects).
The elections in our sample are not spread uniformly across the year. October to November typically host more elections while January hosts about half of the number of elections happening during an average month of a year. Insofar as politicians can time election dates within a certain time window (e.g., a calendar year) and they perceive it to be beneficial to hold elections in months which are known, for seasonal reasons, to be associated with high economic activity and strong growth in M1, our results could be driven by reverse causality. We include the month fixed effects to control for this 13 00820 9
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possibility in the baseline and we show that the results are robust to country-specific month fixed effects and to seasonal adjustment of the data (columns (6) to (9)). We can address the issue of strategic timing of elections more directly by restricting attention to the 28 countries (n=4353) in our main sample that have fixed election days (for their legislature) and where reverse causality by definition cannot be an issue. The estimate of election month for this sub-sample, based on a specification similar to that reported in Table 1 , column (1) is equal to 0.012 with a standard deviation of 0.0040 and, thus, significant at the 1% level. All in all, this suggests that the results are not due to timing effects and reverse causality.
The timing of the election date effect
The evidence presented in Table 1 does not show whether the election date effect begins in the months before the election and/or lingers into the months afterwards. To investigate the timing of the effect, we estimate equation (1) with lags or leads of election month included. Table A3 in the supplementary material reports the results. Column (1) shows a specification with two leads and two lags while columns (3) to (6) show specifications with each lag or lead on its own and column (2) shows, for comparison, a specification with Election month. There is no evidence of any monetary expansion in the two months before the election but there is evidence of an effect in the post-election month. The point estimate on the post-election month dummy is larger than for the election month, but not statistically different. This suggests that the monetary effect of elections persists into the month after the election consistent with some lag in the monetary transmission. 
The OECD sample
The sample of 17 "old" OECD countries is of particular interest because the "old" OECD countries have long-established democratic institutions and, generally, score highly on
16
We have estimated specification with three lags and leads and the third lag/lead is insignificant.
14 00820 9 Table A3 , columns (7) to (12) in the supplementary material report the results. We find no evidence of any monetary election cycle in the election month, nor in the months before or after the election. The election date effect that we find is, therefore, present only in the sample of non-OECD countries.
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Legislative and executive elections
Our samples include a mixture of legislative and executive elections. For some countries, executive and legislative elections take place on the same day. To investigate heterogeneity in the election date effect across election types, we have split Election month into three sub-indicators: one for legislative elections only; one for executive elections only; and one for simultaneous legislative and executive elections.
17
We, then, re-estimated equation
(1) with these refined Election month variables. Table A4 , columns (1) to (4) in the supplementary material report the results for the non-OECD sample; columns (5) to (8) report the corresponding results for the OECD sample. We observe that the point estimates are positive for the non-OECD sample, but that it is executive elections of the head of state that drive the significance of the overall election date effect (column (3)).
Joint elections almost triples the size of the point estimate (column (4)). The results for the OECD sample are not statistically significant.
In conclusion, our baseline result is a robust, statistically significant, and economically meaningful monthly election cycle in the growth rate of M1 in non-OECD countries. The effect is centred on the month of the election and lingers into the post-election month.
The effect is strongest in executive elections. On the other hand, we cannot detect the effect in the sample of OECD countries. These empirical facts are new to the literature. was previously hoarded outside of the banking system (e.g., in the shadow economy), is used for transactions, it (partially) returns to the banking sector. This can happen in two ways. First, the hoarded cash returns directly to banks if the recipients deposit it or substitutes it for deposits that they would otherwise have withdrawn. This effect is clearly strongest in societies with easy access to banking services. Secondly, the hoarded cash also returns to the banks if the recipients spend the cash on goods and the retailers subsequently deposit their revenue from these transactions in a bank.To the extent that the hoarded cash returns to the banking system, the commercial banks experience an increase in their reserves which increases their potential to lend. In the monetary terminology, this reduction in cash hoardings increases, possibly with some lag, the money
18
In supplementary material appendix C, we sketch a simple model of the banking sector that illustrates the economics of these various effects.
16 00820 9
Review of Economics and Statistics
multiplier and, hence, M1. Third, in a fixed or managed exchange rate system with a convertible currency, an increase in the demand for local currency from abroad around the time of elections will trigger appreciation pressure which must be accommodated by liquidity from the central bank.
To discern the degree of active central bank involvement in generating the election date effect, we ideally would study the growth rate in the supply of primary money (the money base) around elections as this, rather than M1, is what the central bank controls.
Since the relevant data on a monthly frequency for a sufficient number of countries is unavailable, we employ an alternative approach. We investigate the extent to which the Table 2 , columns (1) to (6) show that the central bank's lending rate neither changes in the election month nor in the months prior to or after that.
Another way the central bank could affect the growth rate of M1 in election months is to fund short-term government spending directly.
19
If so, the funds constitute an injection of primary money into the economy and affect M1 directly. If this is the monetary mechanism behind the election date effect, then the effect should be stronger in countries in which the central bank is under government influence (e.g., Berger et al. 2001 ). We 
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(8) All regressions control for GDP growth, GDP p.c., inflation, the exchange rate, resource rents, polity index of democracy, new democracy dummy; include three lags of the dependent variable; and country, year and month fixed effects. In the sample with the 21 countries for which data on the refinancing rate can be obtained in columns (1) to (6), the point estimate on election month is positive but not statistically significant. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the level of countries. 
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To this end, we augment equation (1) This militates against the hypothesis that the election date effect is caused by public spending funded directly by the central bank.
21
Taken together, these results strongly speak against active central bank intervention as the main explanation for the election date effect.
To discern if the election date effect is caused by extra demand for cash, we can study the degree of substitution from broad (M2 or M3) to narrow (M1) money in election months.
22
To do this, we study the
ratio around the election. We net out M1 in the denominator because M1 is contained in M2 and we want to know if assets which are part of M2 and not part of M1 are converted into M1 around the election. We also study the growth rates of M2 and M3 directly. These should not increase in election months if the increase in cash demand is funded entirely by liquidizing assets unique to M2 or M3. The evidence presented in Honig (2009, 2010 ) supports this conclusion.
M2 comprises M1 plus deposits with agreed maturity up to two years and deposits redeemable at notice up to three months. M3 comprises M2 plus repurchase agreements, money market fund shares and money market papers, and debt securities up to two years. The source of these data is International Monetary Fund (2018). Table A7 in the supplementary material. 20 00820 9
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that the ratio is higher in election months than in other months. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the election date effect is, in part, caused by substitution effects from broad to narrow money. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the effect of Election month on the growth rates of M2 (column (8)) and M3 (column (9)) are not statistically significant.
The vote buying hypothesis
The election date effect is present only in the sample of non-OECD countries, many of which have comparably weak electoral institutions, and not in established OECD democracies.
23
That fact that the cycle is timed around the election -in the election month and the month thereafter -and not in the months leading up to the election suggests that this phenomenon cannot be explained by traditional political business cycle models that focus on attempts by the incumbent government to manipulate monetary policy in the run-up to an election with the aim of engineering favorable economic conditions. An alternative explanation is required. We propose that the abnormally high monetary growth in the election month may be indicative of systemic vote buying triggered by the effect it has on cash demand.
24
The political science and economics literature is abundant with surveys,
23
Brender and Drazen (2005), Shi and Svensson (2006) and Hanusch and Keefer (2014) , amongst others, have previously shown that electoral politics in societies with inexperienced or uninformed voters or with "young" political parties facilitates political business cycles in government spending and other fiscal outcomes. Potrafke (2018) reports evidence of an election cycle in perceived corruption. Keefer and Vlaicu (2008) , Hanusch and Keefer (2014) and Hidalgo and Nichter (2015) consider the link between vote buying and political budget cycles in fiscal variables.
24
We use the term vote buying to refer to two related strategies. 
25
The logic is that vote buying requires liquid resources (cash) to be distributed to voters. This creates a spike in the demand for money causing irregularities in the supply of money. Since vote buying takes place close to an election, the effect on M1 is timed around the day of the election. Accordingly, systemic vote buying will be detectable as a spike in the growth rate of M1 within a short window around the election. The link between the extra cash demand triggered by vote buying and M1 can, as discussed in section 3, operate through substitution from broader assets to cash or through a short-run multiplier effect induced by the return to the banking sector of hoarded cash that is spent on consumption goods.
We refer to this as the vote buying hypothesis.
We are not able to provide causal evidence in support of this hypothesis since we do not observe any plausibly exogenous variation across elections in vote buying. However, we present four pieces of evidence that are consistent with the vote buying hypothesis, but we cannot establish its validity conclusively.
Electoral irregularities
An implication of the vote buying hypothesis is that, within a country, the magnitude of the election date effect should be larger in elections with a lot of vote buying than in elections with less. Many of the elections included in the non-OECD sample were subject to external monitoring by the European Union, the United Nations, the US State Department or numerous non-governmental organizations. The purpose of such monitoring is to verify if elections are fairly conducted, and to record and report any irregularities. Drawing on Kelley (2012) , who has systematized the information contained
Another strategy is to buy turnout, i.e., to offer cash payments to induce core supporters to cast their vote (see, e.g., Nichter 2014) or to induce opposition voters to stay home (see, e.g., Cox and Kousser 1981) .
25
See Stokes (2005) , Finan and Schechter (2012) , Wantchekon (2003) , Vicente (2014) or Hicken et al. (2015) . scored as a zero if the election is considered to be "free and fair" (acceptable) and is scored as one if it does "not represent the will of the people" or if it is judged to be "fraudulent and to fall short of international standards" (unacceptable). Elections in between these extremes are given a score of 0.5. Second, the variable Election day cheating records evidence of vote padding, inflated vote counts, ballot stuffing, double voting and vote buying, etc. This is a direct measure of any irregularities that took place close to the election. The original data are coded on a "no problems" to "major problems" scale in four steps which we normalize to a point distribution between zero and one. To construct these variables, we use the evaluations of the US State Department and the Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe, both of which must be considered relatively objective and consistent observers, as well as the average or the maximum score from all the monitoring reports available from Kelley (2012) . 
The quality of institutions
The vote buying hypothesis implies that the size of the election date effect depends on the quality of a country's political institutions. In particular, large-scale vote buying does not usually occur in countries with "authoritarian" political institutions where the 24 00820 9
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elections that do take place are tightly controlled by the ruling government party, making vote buying redundant. Similarly, in countries with strong democratic institutions where a vibrant press and other well-working checks and balances make large-scale vote buying impossible. Vote buying, therefore, on a scale that can effect on M1 is most likely to take place in countries with institutions in between these extremes, i.e., in countries with contested elections that, because of prevailing institutional weaknesses, are susceptible to vote buying (and other types of fraud). Given this, the vote buying hypothesis predicts an inverse U-shaped relationship between the quality of a country's political institutions and the size of the election date effect.
To test this implication, we use the Polity IV index (Center for Systematic Peace 2015), normalized to be between zero (weak institutions) and one (strong institutions), to quantify the "quality of political institutions". We include the index and its square along with interactions of the two with Election month in equation 1. To maximize the range of the Polity IV index, we combine the non-OECD and OECD samples. Figure 1 plots the estimate of the election date effect at different values of the Polity IV index along with 95% confidence intervals. We observe an inverse U-shaped relationship between the size of the election date effect and the Polity IV index, with the pattern being clearer for the seasonally adjusted data (in panel (b)). The election date effect is statistically significant only for countries located in the middle range of the index. Put the other way around, the election date effect is neither significant in countries with a low Polity IV scores and week institutions nor in those countries (belonging mostly in the OECD) with a "perfect" Polity IV score of one. van Ham and Lindberg (2015) finds a similar effect in their study of self-reported vote buying in Africa. Overall, this is consistent with the vote buying hypothesis.
The closeness of elections
Another implication of the vote buying hypothesis is that vote buying is most likely to be used as an electoral strategy in elections that are expected ex ante to be close.
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Candidates and political parties have less incentive to buy vote if they are almost sure to lose or to win.
28
To test this implication, we approximate the "closeness" of an election by the ex post vote share of the incumbent government party or coalition in parliamentary elections and of the president in executive elections.
29
We augment equation 1 with the variable vote share and its square along with interactions of the two with Legislative election or Executive election, respectively. Figure 3 shows that the election date effect has an inverse U-shaped relation with the vote share of the incumbent in the non-OECD countries. The effect is statistically significant in elections where the vote share of the incumbent is between 40 and 60% in legislative elections (Figure 3(a) ), and between 40 and 80% in executive elections (Figure 3(b) ). This evidence is consistent with the vote buying hypothesis. In interpreting this, we should bear in mind that the ex post outcome of an election is, partly, a function of the amount of ex ante vote buying. Figure 3 (c) and (d) show that the election date effect is insignificant irrespective of the "closeness" of the election in the sample of OECD countries.
Consumption expenditures and elections: evidence from Armenia
One of the mechanisms through which vote buying can affect M1 is that cash hoarded in the black economy gets dispersed to a large number of voters who spend the cash which subsequently, when deposited by retailers and shopkeepers, finds its way back to the banking system. A necessary condition for this effect to operate is that household
28
The logic is similar to the result from the literature on probabilistic voting that parties will promise post-election programmatic benefits to districts (or groups of voters) who are willing to swing their vote (e.g., Dixit and Londregan 1996; Keefer and Vlaicu 2008) .
29
The source of the data on vote shares is Beck et al. (2001) . In non-election years, vote share is coded as the vote share gained by the incumbent in the most recent election. In this section, we present micro-econometric evidence to substantiate this aspect of the vote buying hypothesis. The idea, which was first developed by Mitra et al. (2017) in a study of vote buying in India, is to use household survey data to look for an increase in consumption around elections. See also Gillitzer and Prasad (2018) .
31
See, e.g., Aravot Daily (2012 (2003, 2007, and 2012) and four presidential elections (2003 with two rounds, 2008, and 2013) .
32
The Armenian household survey is conducted throughout a calendar year. This means that within a year households start their one month of daily records of consumption at different times.
In contrast to many other consumption surveys, this allows us to study the consumption patterns of those households that were surveyed in the days and weeks around each
election. An additional advantage is that, unlike the data used, for example, by Mitra et al. (2017) , the survey records consumption expenditures daily for the same household.
We can, therefore, not only study finely timed (daily) consumption patterns but we can also control for unobserved household fixed effects.
Identification strategy
As in Mitra et al. (2017) , we hypothesize that if vote buying occurs, then it should be reflected in household consumption patterns. According to the permanent income hypothesis, rational households with access to a perfect capital market do not react to anticipated income shocks and respond to unanticipated ones by smoothing consumption or not, will have no or little immediate effect on consumption. However, many of the households that "sell" their vote are poor and face liquidity constraints. Such households will respond to both anticipated and unanticipated income shocks by increasing consumption.
33
We do not know the exact timing of vote buying activity, except that they will have to take place before the election, nor do we know precisely when any extra income might be converted into extra consumption. We, therefore, specify an empirical model that allows us to study the timing of potential consumption responses in a flexible manner with different time windows. In particular, we follow Mitra et al. (2017) and specify a differences-in-differences model but with daily intervals around the election date. To create the treatment group (which is treated to income shocks from vote buying), we start by defining a cut-off of 14 days after an election 34 and count 2 * δ days backwards in time from that cut-off. All the households that fill in a daily diary within this time window of 2 * δ days are in the treatment group. We assume that a treated household is in the "after" group during the [0, δ) days and in the "before" group during the [δ, 2 * δ] before the cut-off. Figure 4 visualizes this approach. For example, if δ is equal to 20 days, then the households in the treatment group are treated (the "after" group) during the 6 days before and 14 days after the election and untreated (the "before" group) during the 20 days prior to that (i.e., the "before" period starts 26 and ends 6 days before the election).
This is demonstrated by a large literature that studies the effects of various anticipated and unanticipated income shocks on consumption behavior (Parker 1999; Stephens Jr 2003; Johnson et al. 2006; Stephens and Unayama 2011; Mian and Sufi 2012; Aaronson et al. 2012; Parker et al. 2013; Agarwal et al. 2017) . For reviews, see Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) and Fuchs-Schuendeln and Hassan (2016) .
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We have chosen 14 days after the election as the cut-off as this will give the households a couple of weeks to spend the extra income they may get prior to the election. By varying δ between 4 and 40, we can split the treatment group into different "before"
and "after" group and in that way create different treatment windows around the election.
For example, for δ = 40 the treatment starts 66 days before the election while for δ = 4 the treatment window is much shorter and starts 10 days after the election. To construct the control group, Mitra et al. (2017) take advantage of the staggered nature of elections across Indian states and use neighboring states without elections as the control group.
Since we study national elections that are held on the same day everywhere, we cannot follow that approach. Instead, our control group consists of the households surveyed on the same dates (2 * δ days) as the treatment group but in the year before and the year after the election year. Table A9 reports sample sizes for the control and treatment groups for the maximum time window of 80 days (δ = 40). In this case, the combined sample consists of about 570 thousand daily observations from about 25.8 thousand households.
The differences-in-differences specification that we estimate for different values of δ is:
where i is the index for a household and t is the index for calendar days and Y it is a consumption outcome of interest (see below). The dummy variable T reated(δ) it is coded 1 for the households that for a given interval of 2 * δ days belong to the treatment group and zero otherwise and the dummy variable Af ter(δ) it is coded 1 for the δ days round the election where the treated households are subject to the "election treatment".
The coefficient of interest is α 3 which captures the average treatment effect (ATE) on consumption. As in Stephens Jr (2003), we include day of the week, DOW , and day of the year, DOY , fixed effects to ensure that our results are not biased by particular dates (such as Christmas) or certain days of the week (as elections are not always held on a specific weekday). Importantly, the specification includes household-specific fixed effects. Table A8 of the supplementary material.
35
We observe that at the median food is about 13% of household income but that this share varies substantially across the income distribution. Within food consumption the largest five product categories in term of the share of expenditure are: starch (28%), meat and fish (20%), fruits and vegetables (13%), dairy (8%) and sugar and confectionery (6%) products.
Results
We present the results in a sequence of diagrams. The election day is denoted with a vertical line (at δ = 14). To understand how to read the diagram, take, for example, a value of δ = 20. The corresponding point estimate represents a scenario where the before treatment period starts 26 days and ends 6 days before the election, and the treatment period starts 6 days before and ends 14 days after the election.
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We study food consumption because these items are purchased at a high frequency and, therefore, recorded in the daily diaries for most days. 
Conclusions
This paper offers a new perspective on the monetary effects of elections by studying monthly data on M1. We report robust evidence of a systematic monetary expansion during the election and post-election months in a sample of up to 104 non-OECD countries between 1975 and 2015. The expansion amounts to about 1/13th of a standard deviation in the month-to-month growth rate of M1. We cannot find a similar effect in mature OECD democracies. This stylized fact is new to the literature on monetary political business cycles.
We propose the vote buying hypothesis to explain this short-run monetary cycle. Largescale, systematic vote buying creates a spike in the demand for money timed around the election, which through conversion of broader monetary instruments (from M2 or M3 to M1) or through black economy returns to the banking system leading to an endogenous expansion of M1 around elections. Although we cannot provide conclusive proof that this is the mechanism behind the observed cycle in M1, we present comprehensive evidence that bolster the credibility of the hypothesis. We find that the cycle is most pronounced in elections which are reported by independent election monitors to be affected by vote buying and other irregularities and absent in elections that are assessed to be free and fair. Moreover, the election-date effect in monetary expansion is stronger in close elections where political competition is intense and, hence, vote buying particularly rewarding for candidates. We also present micro-econometric evidence from Armenia of an increase in consumption around elections. The magnitude of this increase could have been funded by income from selling votes and is also similar to the size of the monetary expansion. Table   A6 in the supplementary material. Table A7 in the supplementary material.
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